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BANKRUPTCY LAW
DEED OF TRUST HELD TO BE PROPERTY OF DEBTOR IN CHAPTER XI
ARRANGEMENT

Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. CameliaBuilders, Inc.
(In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors)
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act' provides an insolvent debtor
with a means of relief less severe than liquidation. 2 Pursuant to this
chapter, a debtor may voluntarily effect an arrangement 3 with his
unsecured creditors4 under the auspices of the bankruptcy court,
while retaining possession and use of its property.5 In order to administer the orderly rehabilitation of the debtor under Chapter XI,
the bankruptcy court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor's property wherever located.' Additionally, bankruptcy
rule 11-44 provides that the filing of a Chapter XI petition automatically stays any judicial proceeding against the debtor and prohibits7
the commencement of any suit to enforce a lien against its property.
Bankruptcy Act §3 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).

Rehabilitation of the debtor is the objective of Chapter XI. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
0.01 (14th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. Straight bankruptcy, which involves
the liquidation of a debtor's estate, is dealt with in Chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy
Act. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-72, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3 An arrangement is defined as "any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or
2

extension of the time of payment of any of his unsecured debts, upon any terms." Bankruptcy

Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). For a description of the procedures used in Chapter
XI, see Butler, Proceedings Under ChapterXI of the FederalBankruptcy Act, 11 GA. ST. B.J.
220 (1975).

The claims of secured creditors are not included in a Chapter XI arrangement. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). Thus, an arrangement pursuant to this section
may not modify or affect the status of secured creditors. SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940); 8 COLLIER, supra note 2, 2.07[3], at 77. See
note 46 infra.
5 Absent the appointment of a receiver by the.court, Bankruptcy Act § 332, 11 U.S.C. §
732 (1970), the debtor is permitted to retain possession of his property. Id. § 342, 11 U.S.C. §
742 (1970). Moreover, the debtor-in-possession has the authority, subject to the control of the
court, to operate his business and manage his property during the Chapter XI proceedings.
Id. § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
8 Id. § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
7 Bankruptcy rule 11-44 became effective July 1, 1974. Bankruptcy Rules and Official
Bankruptcy Forms, 415 U.S. 1003, 1033-35 (1974). It was promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1970), which provides that "[tihe Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right."
The importance of the Chapter XI rules cannot be overemphasized since they supersede
much of Chapter XI. "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
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Since this stay extends only to proceedings involving property over
which the Chapter XI court has jurisdiction,8 the courts often must
determine whether a debtor's particular interest constitutes property within the meaning of the Act. If the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction, the referee has the power, pursuant to bankruptcy rule
920,1 to punish any conduct prohibited by section 41a of the Act,
which provides that a person shall not "disobey or resist any lawful
order, process, or writ" in proceedings before a referee.' 0
Against this background, the Second Circuit, in Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fidelity Mortgage
Investors)," recently resolved two significant issues affecting Chapter XI arrangements. The court first held that a debtor's deed of
trust constitutes property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
Act, thereby subjecting it to the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction and making conflicting claims to the underlying property
subject to the rule 11-44 stay.1 2 Next, the Second Circuit found that
although the referee is not expressly given the power to punish violation of a bankruptcy rule as contempt, rule 920 implicitly authorizes
this sanction."
Fidelity Mortgage Investors (FMI), a real estate investment
trust,1 4 granted a construction loan to the developer of a condominium project in Jackson, Mississippi. In return for that loan, FMI
received a first deed of trust on the project and the land on which
it was to be built. 5 Camelia Builders, Inc. and Farnale, Inc. were
after such rules have taken effect." Id. See King, The ProposedChapterXI Rules and Official
Forms, 47 RF_. J. 127 (1973); Treister, The Proposed ChapterX and XI Rules, 47 REF. J. 1
(1973).
' See Mid-Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir.
1975); Best TV Inc. v. Allen (In re Muntz TV Inc.), 229 F.2d 314, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1956);
Northern Paper Mills v. Cary (In re Patten Paper Co.), 86 F.2d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1936); 6
COLLIER, supra note 2, 1 3.32, at 657.
1 Bankruptcy rule 920(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: "Any... conduct prohibited by
§ 41a of the Act may be punished by the referee only after hearing on notice."
tO Bankruptcy Act § 41a, 11 U.S.C. § 69a (1970).
" 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 185 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1977), aff'g [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 65,865 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'g 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 386 (Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1975).
,O10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 195-96.
"

Id. at 193-94.

A real estate investment trust is an unincorporated trust, owned by 100 or more
persons whose ownership is evidenced by transferable shares. The trust obtains certain percentages of its income from investments in realty. It may not hold any property "primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business." I.R.C. § 856(a)(4).
," 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 188. In a number of jurisdictions, a mortgagor conveys a deed
to a third person as trustee for both the mortgagor and the secured party. This is denominated
a deed of trust, and has much the same effect as a mortgage with power of sale in the creditor.
"
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organized as a joint venture and acted as general contractor on the
development. They held materialmens' and mechanics' liens on the
project for supplies and labor furnished. The condominium developer ran into financial difficulties, and shortly thereafter FMI also
faced ecomomic problems. In January 1975 FMI filed a Chapter XI
petition in the Southern District of New York. 6
After FMI had commenced a nonjudicial sale of the secured
property, Camelia and Farnale instituted an action in federal district court in Mississippi in March 1975 to have their liens declared
superior to FMI's interest. 7 Pursuant to that action FMI was allowed to complete the sale, but was forced to deposit the proceeds
of the sale into court until a determination on the merits could be
made.'" FMI then moved in the New York bankruptcy court to have
Camelia and Farnale held in contempt for instituting the suit without the bankruptcy court's permission.' 9 Bankruptcy Judge Herzog
found Camelia and Farnale in contempt. 21 Concluding that the limThe title to the property remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure. The major practical
difference between a mortgage and a deed of trust is that a deed of trust may be foreclosed
without a court decree. 9 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4660 (rev. ed. 1958). Although the
beneficiary of the trust gains no title to the property, he has an inherent interest in the land
since he can cause the trustee to sell it and have the proceeds applied to payment of his loan.
Baker v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 701, 18 So. 2d 438 (1944); 4A R. PowLL,
REAL PROPERTY 574 (rev. ed. 1977).
, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 188.
,7Id. at 188-89. The action sought an order enjoining FMI from proceeding with its
foreclosure sale, declaring Camelia's and Farnale's mechanics' lien superior to FMI's, and, if
the sale were not enjoined, requiring FMI to remit the proceeds of the sale to the court to the
extent of $75,964.33. See 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 388.
" 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 189.
"Id. The bankruptcy court can vacate the rule 11-44 stay upon a showing that
"immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result." BANKR. R. 11-44(e).
1 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 388. Judge Herzog found that Hubbard, attorney for Farnale,
knew of the rule 11-44 stay and intentionally ignored it, hoping that appellants' action could
be justified by 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1970), which permits suits against debtors-in-possession
arising out of transactions involved in the debtors' continuing business. This § 959 defense
was not accepted by the Second Circuit. 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 200. The court noted that
the purpose of § 959 is to enable a debtor-in-possession to continue his business after filing a
Chapter XI petition. If the debtor could continue his business while obtaining immunity from
suits arising out of new transactions, new business would be difficult to find. "Suppliers
would be less likely to provide merchandise, banks would be less likely to extend credit and
workers would be less likely to undertake employment.., if they were foreclosed from suing
the debtor. .. ." Id. In Fidelity, however, appellants' suit arose, not from transaction of new
business, but from a transaction which occurred prior to the Chapter XI proceedings. This
type of action, i.e., one brought after the debtor's bankruptcy petition and based on a prebankruptcy transaction, is specifically what the rule 11-44 stay was designed to prevent.
Recognizing that the distinction between a suit arising from transaction of new business and
a suit based on old business may be unclear in certain instances, the court nevertheless found
no such ambiguity in Fidelity. The suit by Camelia and Farnale "arose from FMI's bank-
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ited punishment he could impose was insufficient, he certified the
matter to the district court.2 1 There, Judge Owen ruled that Judge
Herzog's findings were not clearly erroneous, and upheld the con22

tempt citation.

A divided Second Circuit panel upheld the district court's decision. 23 The author of the majority opinion, Judge Smith, quickly
concluded that FMI's deed of trust was property within the meaning
of the Act. In so holding, the court relied solely on the Supreme
Court's treatment of the bankruptcy property concept in Segal v.
Rochelle.2 4 The Fidelity court stated that in bankruptcy, "the term
'property' has been construed most generously and an interest is not
outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed."25 Applying this liberal interpretation, the
majority held that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction over
2
FMI's deed.

1

Turning next to the appellants' contention that the contempt
citation was unauthorized, Judge Smith concluded that rule 920
must be interpreted to permit contempt proceedings for violation of
the bankruptcy rules. Noting that the rules are to be construed so
as to aid in the expeditious processing of bankruptcy petitions, the
Second Circuit reasoned that affording violators of a rule immunity
from punishment by the referee through his contempt powers would
hamper this underlying policy.Y Moreover, according to the court,
rule 11-44 has the effect of an order and was adopted to "expedite
automatically the stay that would otherwise be obtained by an
order." 8 Thus, the majority concluded that a contrary holding
would be "exalting form over substance.

'2

As further support for

ruptcy, rather than FMI's continuing conduct of business. . . ." Id. at 200-01. Cf. Austrian
v. Williams, 216 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953 (1955)(attempted collection and liquidation of debtor's assets by trustee is not continuation of debtor's business).
21Bankruptcy rule 920(a)(3) provides that a bankruptcy judge is limited to imposing a
fine for contempt of not more than $250. If he believes a greater sanction is warranted, he
may certify the facts to a district court judge. The district court may punish by fine or
imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1970), which vests the court with discretion
as to the terms of penalty. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
2 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. RaE. (CCH) 65,865, at 75,590-91.
21 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 189. Judge Smith wrote the majority opinion for himself and
Judge Mansfield. Judge Van Graafeiland authored a dissenting opinion.
2,382 U.S. 375 (1966).
10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 196, quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
26 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 196.
Id. at 194.
Id. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 194.
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the court's holding, Judge Smith cited cases holding that a willful,
knowing violation of rules 40130 and 601,31 which provide automatic
stays similar to that of rule 11-44, constitutes
contempt of court
2
punishable by the bankruptcy judge.1

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland declared
that FMI had no possessory property interest under the Act and,
therefore, the bankruptcy court's essentially in rem jurisdiction was
absent.3 3 Interpreting the applicable Mississippi law, he viewed the
deed of trust as a conveyance of an interest limited to the beneficiary's right to "cause the trustee to sell the land and apply the
proceeds to the payment of the secured debt. 3 4 Thus, the dissent
'35
concluded that FMI had no "estate in the land.

Judge Van Graafeiland also dissented from the majority's holding on the contempt issue. Expressing grave concern over the expansion of contempt powers beyond the literal wording of the statute
conferring those powers, he contended that "statutory contempt
3
proceedings should be reviewed in a highly technical manner. 1
Moreover, the disssent found that the omission of the term rules
from section 41a was intentional since this section was patterned
after section 401 of Title 18, which expressly includes rules.3 1 Shar-

"

Bankruptcy rule 401 provides that the filing of a petition for bankruptcy "shall operate
as a stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against the bankrupt, or the
enforcement of any judgment against him, if the action or judgment is founded on an unsecured provable debt. ..."
3,Bankruptcy rule 601 provides that "[t]he filing of a petition shall operate as a stay
of any act or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce (1) a lien
against property in the custody of the bankruptcy court. ..."
u 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 194, citing United States v. Moore (In re Tallyn), [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
65,617 (E.D. Va. 1975); In re Young, 1 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 145 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
13 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 205-06 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Judge Van Graafeiland noted that a given project might be subject to numerous mechanics' liens and mortgages.
He interpreted the majority holding as a finding that the mortgaged premises are the property
of the mortgagee and feared that this could result in troublesome jurisdictional disputes if
various lienors, in succession, filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 206 n. 7. See note 63 infra.
1110 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 205 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). The Mississippi Supreme Court decided in Baker v. Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 701, 18 So. 2d
438 (1944), that the holder of a deed of trust has no title in the land described therein.
10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 206 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
Id. at 206, citing Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67,
70 (10th Cir. 1942); Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir.), appeal
dismissedper stipulation,308 U.S. 629 (1939); In re Probst, 205 F. 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1913). In
these cases the courts refused to punish those who had allegedly violated court orders which
were directed to other parties. Since no order was directed to any of the defendants, the courts
found no contempt. None of these courts was faced with the technical significance of the use
of the terms writs, orders, process, or rules.
3118 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "A court of the United States shall
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ing Justice Douglas' opinion that the exercise of the contempt power
"is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary and oppressive conclusions,""8 Judge Van Graafeiland concluded that construing rule 920 to permit the punishment of someone remotely affected
by the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for violation of "one of the
many, little known rules of bankruptcy procedure" was extremely
objectionable. 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Segal does not in itself mandate the Fidelity result." Segal involved an inquiry into the nature
of the property interests which revert to the trustee in a straight
bankruptcy proceeding. The Supreme Court held that a loss carryback tax refund was property within the meaning of section 70a of
the Act,4 thereby vesting title in the trustee. In making this determination, the Court observed that it is impossible to define property
categorically for bankruptcy purposes and that the term encompasses interests which are novel and contingent as well as those where
enjoyment must be postponed. 2 The Court reasoned that since in
straight bankruptcy every valuable asset possessed by the debtor at
the time the petition is filed must be secured for the protection of
his creditors, the scope of the term property should be broadly con43
strued.
have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as - (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command."
" 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 208 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), quoting 411 U.S. 989,
993 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from promulgation of the bankruptcy rules, quoting Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)(Taft, C.J.)).
3' 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 208 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
4oSee text accompanying note 44 infra.
Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1970) sets forth the property interests which
vest in the trustee upon the filing of a straight bankruptcy petition. The guiding criterion
under this section is susceptibility to transfer or levy. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 1 (1924); Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.

949 (1950); C.

NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY

§ 272 (2d ed. S. Nadler & M. Nadler 1972).

It is evident that the trustee will be vested with any rights the bankrupt possesses as lienor
or mortgagee pursuant to this section. See, e.g., 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.16[61, at
156.1.
2 382 U.S. at 379.
Id. Accord, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1974). For examples of situations in which the courts have employed this broad definition to protect creditors, see Kolb
v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966) (money due for earned annual leave); Ryan v. Chatz
(In re A. Roth Co.), 118 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1941) (mortgagor's equity of redemption); In re
Zeitzer Food Corp., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 614 (Bankr. Ct. E.D.N.Y. July 26, 1976) (license to
purchase farm products for resale to institutional buyers); Georgia Power Co. v. Securities
Invest. Prop., Inc. (In re Security Invest. Prop. Inc.), 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 151 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (right to electrical service).
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Although the Segal Court's approach to the definitional problem may be applicable to Fidelity, certain distinctions between the
two cases must be noted. The interest involved in Segal was clearly
either the bankrupt's or the trustee's. No third parties made any
claim to the refund. In contrast, the Fidelity court had to determine
whether an interest in property in which third parties asserted rights
that had arisen prior to the Chapter XI petition came within the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The Segal dispute, moreover, arose
in the course of a straight bankruptcy proceeding, whereas Fidelity
involved a Chapter XI arrangement. It is suggested that although
Segal does support the Second Circuit's decision by analogy, it is
not fully apposite, and thus, instead of relying solely on Segal, the
Fidelity court should have examined the property concept in a
Chapter XI context. This would necessitate an examination of the
purposes of Chapter XI proceedings, an approach clearly in accord
with the Supreme Court's rationale in Segal."
Chapter XI proceedings seek to preserve the debtor as a functioning entity. 5 To achieve this result, it is often necessary to compel alteration or adjustment of existing legal rights in the debtor's
business and property." In order to effectively administer these proA somewhat different approach was taken by the Supreme Court in Lines v. Frederick,
400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam). In determining that accrued unpaid vacation pay was not
property within Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110a(5) (1970), the Court wrote: "The
most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of 'property' lies in the
basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor a 'new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.'"
400 U.S. at 19, quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934). Thus, the concern
for granting the bankrupt a fresh start, rather than the policy of securing everything of value
for creditors, was predominant in Lines. See 49 N.C.L. Rav. 738, 740 (1971).
In Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), the Court again had an opportunity to
discuss the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. The Kokoszka Court stated that the Act has a
dual objective-liquidating the bankrupt's estate to satisfy creditors, and providing the bankrupt with a fresh start. The Court directed that in determining the nature of a property
interest, it is necessary to evaluate the asset in light of these principles. Id. at 645-46.
' See 382 U.S. at 379.
The underlying theory of rehabilitation proceedings is that the going concern value of
the business will exceed its liquidation value. R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d
487, 493 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
11 Chapter XI is limited to the adjustment of unsecured debts. SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965). Despite this general principle, it is fallacious to assume
that the secured creditor is not affected by the Chapter XI proceedings. Seidman, The Plight
of the Secured Creditors in ChapterXI, 80 CoM. L.J. 343 (1975). See also Yacos, Secured
Creditorsand ChapterXI of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 REF. J. 29 (1970). The secured creditor's
cause of action is subject to the control provided by the bankruptcy court by its use of the
rule 11-44 stay. A delay in the enforcement of a security interest may result in decline in its
value due to depreciation of the asset upon which the lien is held. See generally Murphy,
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ceedings while equitably settling conflicting claims, exclusive authority is vested in one tribunal-the bankruptcy court. The automatic stay that becomes effective upon filing of the petition for an
arrangement facilitates rehabilitation of the debtor by preventing
creditors in various jurisdictions from initiating proceedings which
would divest the debtor of property crucial to the success of the
plan.47 It is contemplated that the court will assume exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies which directly affect the reorganization effort. 8 In order to effectuate this result, courts presented with
a challenge to the authority of the bankruptcy court have generally
adopted a broad construction of the term property under Chapter
XI. 49
This approach is illustrated by FloridaInstitute of Technology
v. Carpenter (In re Westec Corp.),5 0 a Chapter X proceeding,"'
Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement
Proceedings,30 Bus. LAW. 15, 43 (1974).
That the secured creditor, however, has a constitutional right to receive the value of his
collateral was recognized by the Supreme Court in Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311
U.S. 273 (1940). Justice Douglas stated therein that "[s]afeguards were provided to protect
the rights of secured creditors, throughout the proceedings, to the extent of the value of the
property. There is no constitutional claim of the creditor to more than that." Id. at 278
(citations omitted). In order to protect these rights of secured creditors, rule 11-44(e) authorizes a bankruptcy judge to lift the stay without notice to the debtor if such action is necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to the creditor. See note 70 infra.
" Assets such as inventory, accounts receivable, and income producing property may be
subject to liens of numerous creditors. See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The
Secured Creditor in Reorganizationand Arrangement Proceedings,30 Bus. LAW. 15, 16, 45
(1974). As these assets are necessary for the debtor to continue normal business operations,
a stay is needed to prevent interference with this property by secured creditors during the
Chapter XI proceedings. See, e.g., Teledyne Indus. Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Krull, 21 F. Supp. 377, 378 (M.D. Pa. 1937); 8 CoLLIER, supra note 2,
3.20, at 237.
" See In re International Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1948), wherein the court
observed that the bankruptcy power includes "the collection and distributionof the estates
of bankruptsand the determinationof controversiesin relation thereto." Id. at 402 (emphasis
in original). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Lake, 199 F.2d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 914 (1953); Lake Shore Fin. Co. v. Weir (In re Cuyahoga Fin. Co.), 136 F.2d 18, 21
(6th Cir. 1943); In re Burton Coal Co., 126 F.2d 447, 448 (7th Cir. 1942).
" See In re International Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399, 402 (3d Cir. 1948) wherein the
Third Circuit stated "[tihe tendency of judicial interpretation of the Act has been in the
direction of progressive liberalization in respect of the operation of the bankruptcy power so
as to meet the challenge of present day economic and business conditions."
- 460 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1972).
51A reorganization brought pursuant to Chapter X of Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11
U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970) is quite similar to a Chapter XI arrangement, with many of the
differences being merely procedural. See 9 H. REMINGTON, BANKRuPTcY § 3564 (1955 & Supp.

1976). The main distinction between the two is that a Chapter X reorganization restructures
the entire debt base of the debtor, as against both secured and unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy Act § 216(1), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970). Thus, unlike a Chapter XI arrangement, see
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wherein the Fifth Circuit reached a conclusion similar to that of the
Second Circuit in Fidelity. The Westec court held that a mortgage
lien, although subordinate to a statutory tax lien,"2 was a property
interest sufficient to confer exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy
court. 3 To reach this conclusion, the court reasoned that property

can constitute something other than fee ownership. 4
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the property concept in the same
manner in Texas Co. v. Hauptman.5 There, the debtor in a section
77B proceeding,56 the precursor of Chapters X and XI,11 held a first
mortgage on a ship. The holder of a second mortgage filed a libel
and had the ship seized, despite a stay granted by the bankruptcy
court" against suits against the debtor or his property. The Ninth
note 46 supra, it is not limited to the relationship between the debtor and his unsecured
creditors. The SEC can also take on a more significant role in Chapter X than in Chapter
XI. Bankruptcy Act §§ 172, 173, 208, 328, 11 U.S.C. §§ 572, 573, 708, 728 (1970). For judicial
examination of the relationship between Chapters X and XI, see SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434 (1940); In re Texas Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1973). Nonetheless, the
main objective of both reorganization and arrangement is rehabilitation of the debtor. Caplin
v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972); Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S.
678 (1966); In re Metropolitan Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1008 (1971); G.F. Wertime, Inc. v. Turchick, 358 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1966) (Chapter X);
World Scope Publishers, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965). To effectuate this
purpose, both chapters provide for stay of suits against the debtor or his property. Bankruptcy
Act §§ 113, 116(4), 148, 314, 11 U.S.C. §§ 513, 516(4), 548, 714 (1970). Since the basic
purposes of both are the same, and the underlying statutes identical, the rules applying to
Chapters X and XI must be interpreted similarly, subject to the particular situation involved,
i.e., the nature of the rights which will be affected. PRACTISING LAW INsTrTr, BANKRUPTCY:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 74-75, 97-102 (1974).
52 See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
13 460 F.2d at 1144. In Westec, the Florida authorities held a statutory tax lien on
property on which the debtor held first and second mortgages. Although the taxing authority
was aware of the pending Chapter X proceeding, it conducted a tax sale at which the property
was sold for $20.00. Id. at 1143. The Fifth Circuit was faced with the question whether the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the debtors first and second mortgages so as to allow
it to determine the debtor's right with respect to the underlying property. Holding that the
mortgage interest was a property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that because the taxing authority was aware of the pending
Chapter X proceedings, they were required to seek a lifting of the restraining order before
proceeding with the sale. Since this was not done, the tax deed issued to the buyer at the
sale was ineffective as against the debtor and the debtor's mortgage interest remained intact.
Id.
4 Id.

91 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1937).
5 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 912.
For a discussion of the influence of § 77B on Chapters X and XI, see 9 H. REmiNGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 3564 (1955 & Supp. 1976); 11 id. § 4345. See also In re Commonwealth Bond
Corp., 77 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1935).
' 91 F.2d at 450.
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Circuit ruled that the libel proceeding was not a suit against the
debtor since it was an action in rem. Nor, according to the Texas
Co. court, was it a suit to enforce a lien on the debtor's property,
i.e., the mortgage. 5 The court went on to say, however, that because
property encompasses both the res and rights therein, including
obligations, rights, and other intangibles, the debtor's mortgage interest was property within the court's jurisdiction. Thus, any action
interfering with the debtor's lien was prohibited. 0 The ship could
be seized and sold, but such sale would be subject to the debtor's
lien.'
Texas Co. seems to provide a solid precedent for the decision
in Fidelity. Had Camelia and Farnale been successful in their action, their liens would have been satisfied out of the proceeds of
FMI's nonjudicial sale, thereby reducing, or possibly eliminating
funds otherwise applicable to satisfaction of FMI's deed of trust.
The result would have been a substantial diminution of the value
of FMI's asset, an asset essential to the success of the Chapter XI
arrangement. Instead of being merely a normal foreclosure proceeding, where the subsequent sale is subject to a superior, preexisting
lien, such a suit would destroy the value of an asset of a debtor in
bankruptcy and thus falls squarely within the ambit of rule 11-44.12
Westec and Texas Co. make it clear that the concept of property is
not dependent upon legal ownership. A deed of trust constitutes a
real economic interest in the underlying property and, as such, plays
a major role in any arrangement plan. Viewed in the perspective of
Texas Co., the debtor's mortgage interest is property. As such, it
must fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
and therefore is protected by the rule 11-44 stay. 3
Id. at 450-51.
aoId. at 451-52.
SI Id. at 452.
62 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Van Graafeiland interpreted the majority's decision as establishing that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the condominium project itself. This view overlooks
an important disclaimer in the majority opinion. The Fidelity court clearly indicated that it
was not ruling on the validity of appellants' substantive claims as to the priority of the liens:
"It may be true, as Camelia and Farnale assert, that, by virtue of their allegedly superior
claim under Mississippi law, they are entitled to protection against the consequences of FMI's
attempted foreclosure on the condominium project." 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 201. The court
was not ruling that jurisdiction over the ultimate claim of Camelia and Farnale was situated
in the New York court. Rather, the majority considered the controlling question to be
"whether Camelia and Farnale should have secured permission from the New York bankruptcy court before proceeding with their action in Mississippi." Id. at 202. This distinction
obviates Judge Van Graafeiland's concern over a "jurisdictional maze," id. at 206 n.7 (Van
"
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland cited several
cases which he interpreted as contrary to the majority's definition
of property. 4 In each of these cases, however, the debtor's interest
was manifestly inferior to the interest of others. 5 In each case, the
holder of a primary lien moved to foreclose. While this had the
direct effect of cutting off the debtor's interest, the debtor had no
interest in the property at all until the primary lienholder was satisfied. The suits were brought, not as a direct attack upon the interest of the bankrupt, but to enforce the creditor's patently superior
rights. Although the success of the foreclosure proceedings acted to
cut off the bankrupt's interest, this effect was merely incidental to
the intent and purpose of the proceedings, and thus, the bankruptcy
court lacked the jurisdiction necessary to issue an injunction. 7 The
Graafeiland, J., dissenting); see note 33 supra, since the bankruptcy court could readily grant
permission for all secured creditors in a given project to file their claims in an appropriate
manner. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 2, T 3.22.
11 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 205 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), citing First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (In re Holiday Lodge, Inc.), 300 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Ryan v. Chatz (In re A. Roth Co.), 125 F.2d 396, 398 (7th
Cir. 1942); Brunn v. Wichser, 75 F.2d 25, 28 (3d Cir. 1934).
See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (In re Holiday Lodge Inc.),
300 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962)(debtor's lease contractually
subordinate to any mortgage); Ryan v. Chatz (In re A. Roth Co.), 125 F.2d 396, 398 (7th Cir.
1942) (debtor's interest limited to a second mortgage); Brunn v. Wichser, 75 F.2d 25, 28 (3d
Cir. 1934) (debtor's interest limited to a second mortgage). Judge Van Graafeiland also
interpreted Amadori Constr. Co. v. Hoffenberg (In re Stanndco Devs., Inc.), 534 F.2d 1050
(2d Cir. 1976) as authority for his conclusion that the bankruptcy court in Fidelty lacked
jurisdiction to enjoin appellants' suit. 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 208 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting). The Stanndco decision, however, appears distinguishable. There, plaintiff moved
to vacate a Chapter X stay, so it could proceed to judgment on a surety bond. The bond
was financed with a letter of credit issued by Stanndco which was secured by a mortgage on
Stanndco's property. The court ruled that the stay should be modified, since a judgment
would not result in a foreclosure on Stanndco's property, but rather in collection on the bond.
The court granted plaintiff leave to continue its suit against the surety, but not against
Stanndco. 534 F.2d at 1053-54. It should be noted that plaintiff in Stanndco did move to have
the stay lifted, and the court implicitly accepted the notion that this was a necessity. Id. at
1052.
68 See, e.g., 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 453 (rev. ed. 1977).
17 As noted by the court in First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (In re
Holiday Lodge, Inc.), 300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962) the bankruptcy
court has "no jurisdiction to restrain a state court proceeding to enforce [a] ... lien on...
property to the extent that it [is] superiorto any interest belonging to the debtor in that
property." 300 F.2d at 519 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit, in Florida Inst. of Tech. v.
Carpenter (In re Westec Corp.), 460 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1972), indicated that the general
principle that inferior security interests are outside the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction should
not be applied blindly. There, the debtor held both a first and second mortgage on land
subject to a statutory tax lien for nonpayment of $18.84 in drainage taxes. A Florida statute,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.011 (West 1971) (amended 1973) made this lien superior to all others.
In ruling that a foreclosure proceeding under the tax lien did not eliminate the debtor's
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action brought by Camelia and Farnale, in contrast, constituted a
direct attack upon the interest of FMI.18 Hence, it seems to be
directly within the purview of bankruptcy rule 11-44.
While a persuasive argument can be made that a bankruptcy
court is not an appropriate forum to determine the substantive law
issue of lien superiority,69 this does not affect the viability of the
stay. Rule 11-44 contains a simple and speedy mechanism for removal of the automatic stay.70 The stay simply ensures that the
bankruptcy referee will have notice of all claims against the debtor
and control over the timing of any suits based on those claims.
Thus, the substantive issue can properly be determined in a forum
other than the bankruptcy court, but only after that court's permission has been obtained.
Having determined that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction, the Second Circuit proceeded to consider whether violation
of a bankruptcy rule could properly be punished by the referee in a
contempt proceeding. The stay established by bankruptcy rule 1144 has the effect of a court order. Prior to promulgation of this rule,
interests, the Fifth Circuit stated that in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor,
the "courts should favor the reorganization trustee's rights vis-a-vis the local taxing statutes
.... " 460 F.2d at 1143. The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, 1 COLLIER, supra note 2,
2.09, and will therefore not follow technical rules of law which would work contrary to the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. The Westec court noted a district court decision holding that
an inferior mortgage is not subject to the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, In re Copper
Canyon Mining Co., 156 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1957), but reasoned that the primary consideration behind that decision was the "insignificance" of the debtor's interest. 460 F.2d at 1143.
The Westec opinion indicates that where the primary lien is the insignificant interest, and is
superior only because of the operation of local taxing statutes, the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act require utilization of a broader concept of property so as to confer exclusive jurisdiction
in the bankruptcy court.
" In Fidelity, the intent of appellants' suit was anything but incidental. See note 17 and
accompanying text supra.
11It has often been stated that the nature of the title of the bankrupt to his property is
to be determined by state law. See Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478
(1940); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974); 1
COLLIER, supra note 2, 2.07, at 162-66; C. NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRuPTCY § 272 (2d ed. S.
Nadler & M. Nadler 1972); 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPrcY §§ 34, 38 (1955 & Supp. 1976); 5
id. § 2318. Although the bankruptcy court may determine the applicable state law, it is
usually more prudent to remit the question to the state courts. Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
" Bankruptcy rule 11-44(d) provides that "[u]pon the filing of a complaint seeking
relief from a stay provided by this rule, the bankruptcy court shall ... set the trial for the
earliest possible date, and it shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of
the same character." Rule 11-44(e) provides for ex parte relief where necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff, such as where the statute of limitations on a claim is about
to expire. The type of action commenced by appellants in the Mississippi district court is
one of the situations in which a lifting of the bankruptcy rule 11-44 stay is entirely appropriate. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 2, $ 3.22, at 261.
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a debtor was not automatically granted a stay, but rather, had to
apply for a court order. 7' Rule 11-44 was designed to expedite the
stay, increase the efficiency of Chapter XI proceedings, and grant
the debtor immediate protection. 72 Instead of each referee routinely
issuing a stay as his first act after the petition is filed, as normally
occurred prior to rule 11-44, 73 the stay is now automatically imposed. To insist that the bankruptcy court actually order that rule
11-44 be observed before it can punish a violation of the rule, would
deprive the rule of all meaning. 74 It is well established that "the
The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts . . . . ,,75
contempt power is deemed essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and the administration of justice. 76 As the
Fidelity majority reasoned, a holding that section 41a and bankruptcy rule 920 permit only institution of a contempt action for
violation of an order, writ, or process would be "overly-formalistic"
and "would . . . deprive the courts of the authority necessary to
71Section 314 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970), was the basic restraint
provision of Chapter XI prior to the adoption of rule 11-44. It provides that "[tihe court may
.. upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a
debtor."
72 8 COLLIER, supra note 2, 3.20[3], at 235.
7 As was stated by a member of the rules committee: "The basic difference very simply
is that instead of the bankruptcy judge again routinely, in a pro forma fashion, signing an
order which stays everything, it is the rule itself which does that." King, The Proposed
ChapterXI Rules and Official Forms, 47 REF. J. 127, 132 (1973).
71Use of the contempt power to punish violation of rule 11-44 could create a problem in
situations where the defendant had no notice of the stay. See note 78 infra; King, The
Proposed ChapterXI Rules and Official Forms,47 REF. J. 127, 132 (1973); cf. Bank of Matin
v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966)(bank not liable to trustee for payment of checks drawn prior
to bankruptcy where bank acted without knowledge or notice). But see 14 COLLIER, supra note
2, 11-44.02[4]. In Fidelity, however, no such problem existed for the defendants had actual
knowledge of the stay. Bankruptcy Judge Herzog concluded there was "no doubt that the
respondents were fully aware of the pendency of the Chapter XI case in this court." 5 Collier
Bankr. Cas. at 389. He also found that Hubbard, the attorney for Farnale, "decided to 'try
to hedge [his] bet' and take a chance on violating Rule 11-44." Id. In light of this intentional
disregard for a known rule, it is difficult to share Judge Van Graafeiland's view that an
injustice was being done.
11Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65
(1924). In Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 F. 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1902), it was recognized that bankruptcy courts are inherently vested with the power to punish for contempt. See generally
Notes of Advisory Comm. on Bankruptcy Rules, reprinted in 11 U.S.C. app., at 440-515
(Supp. V 1975).
18A contempt proceeding can be either civil or criminal in nature. If its purpose is
coercive or remedial, i.e., to compel obedience to a court order or to procure substitute relief
for an aggrieved party, it is a civil proceeding. If used to vindicate the authority of the court,
its purpose is punitive and is criminal in nature. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 441 (1911). See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947).
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ensure that the rules are obeyed." 77
While the contempt power may well be a "delicate one," 8 the
majority's holding appears consistent with the underlying purpose
of rule 920. The drafters of the rule considered section 41a of the
Bankruptcy Act to be a substantial paraphrase of section 401 of
Title 18,11 which expressly authorizes punishment for violation of a
rule."0 Moreover, the chronology of events does not support the dissent's position that the omission of "rules" from section 41a is indicative of a legislative intent not to afford bankruptcy courts the
power to treat disregard for a rule as contempt. Section 41a was
enacted seventy-five years prior to the adoption of the modern bankruptcy rules.8 2 Although the Supreme Court in 1898 created bankruptcy rules labelled General Orders, those rules merely established
the procedures necessary to get into bankruptcy court and directed
that the bankruptcy courts issue orders upon the occurrence of specified events.1 Since the only effect of a person's violation of these
General Orders was to prevent him from gaining the rights of a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, there was no need to punish a
violation as contempt and 84no reason for the legislature to include
"rules" within section 41a.

n 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 193-94.
18Id. at 208 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Bankruptcy rule 920 grants a bankruptcy
judge the authority to cite for contempt. He may do so summarily if the misbehavior occurred
in his presence; if committed outside his presence, he may do so only after notice and a
hearing. The power of a judge to summarily punish for contempt has long been the subject
of criticism. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting);
Nelles, Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 956 (1931). But see Ex
parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888). Concern has centered upon ensuring that a given
defendant is afforded due process of law. See Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and
the Constitution: The View From Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 34 (1976). Contempt
for violation of a bankruptcy court order, however, does not present these constitutional
problems. Pursuant to rule 920(b), a defendant who violates a court order can be punished
only upon hearing and notice.
70 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), quoted in note 37 supra.
See Notes of Advisory Comm. on Bankruptcy Rules, reprinted in 11 U.S.C. app., at
512-13 (Supp. V. 1975).
" See 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 208 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
2 Section 41a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 69a (1970), was enacted in 1898.
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 41a, 30 Stat. 556 (1898). At that time, pursuant to Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 541, § 30, 30 Stat. 556 (1898)(repealed 1964), the Supreme Court was given authority
to promulgate rules, forms, and orders to regulate bankruptcy procedure. These rules were
enacted that same year, and were called General Orders. 172 U.S. 653-66 (1898). The modern
bankruptcy rules were adopted in 1973 and superseded General Orders 1-7, 9-12, 14-26, 2840, 42-45, 47, 50, 51, 53 and 56. 411 U.S. 989 (1973).
See General Orders, 172 U.S. 653-66 (1898).
"
It has been suggested, moreover, that section 41a of the Act was unnecessary to confer
the contempt powers on the bankruptcy court since "[a]ny act, matter, or thing which any
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It is submitted that the Fidelity court's resolution of the issues
before it was eminently reasonable. Since the rule 11-44 stay was
designed to replace the pro forma staying order utilized prior to its
adoption, the majority's holding, with respect to rule 11-44, appears
consonant with the intent of its draftsmen.85 A contrary holding
would mandate that each bankruptcy court expressly order compliance with those rules it deems appropriate in the proceedings before
it. Uniformity of procedure and administrative efficiency would
thus be gravely endangered without any corresponding benefit.
Since the purpose of Chapter XI proceedings is the rehabilitation of the debtor,86 it is obvious that all the debtor's assets which
may be essential to its arrangement must be protected from interference during the pendency of proceedings before the bankruptcy
court. 7 When such assets clearly have value to the debtor, the
courts have defined property liberally,88 so that these interests may
be included in the arrangement, or at least subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. No convincing reason appears to exist for
reversing this trend when strangers to the Chapter XI proceedings
seek to assert interests that conflict with those of the debtor.
Through the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction, the bankruptcy
court will be put on notice of conflicting claims, and can control the
timing of actions brought to adjudicate the underlying substantive
issues.8 9 As the Fidelity majority indicates, suits in willful contravention of the rules protecting the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction
will not be countenanced.
Vincent J. Pisano
Stuart M. Strauss
United States court may punish as a contempt may be punished as such by a court of
bankruptcy ...." Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 F. 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1902); cf. 9 H. REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 3535 (1955 & Supp. 1976)(no formal order need be issued by the bankruptcy
court to punish as contempt interference with the court's exclusive jurisdiction when the
contemnor had knowledge of the bankruptcy petition). The Boyd court believed that section
41a was intended merely to indicate that the referee could not himself impose sanctions for
contempt, but could only certify the issue to the district court judge. 116 F. at 135. See also
2A COLLIER, supra note 2, § 41.02.
RINotes of Advisory Comm. on Bankruptcy Rules, reprintedin 11 U.S.C. app., at 51213 (Supp. V 1975).
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
' See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
This liberal construction is exemplified in the cases discussed in note 43 supra.
" See text accompanying note 70 supra.

